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SUBJECT: CWC REVIEW CONFERENCE PART IV: PROCESS AND
LESSONS LEARNED

REF: A. THE HAGUE 349

- [B](#). THE HAGUE 420
- [C](#). THE HAGUE 425
- [D](#). THE HAGUE 433

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-23-08.

SUMMARY

[1](#). (U) This cable is the last of a series on the Second Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference (RevCon) April 7 -18, 2008. It follows the initial report at the end of the Conference (ref A), the reports on the opening plenary sessions of the Conference and the general debate (ref B), events on the margins of the Conference (ref C), and an analysis of the final RevCon report (ref D).

[2](#). (C) Following the RevCon's formal opening sessions and the general debate (ref B), the Conference re-convened on April 10 as the Committee of the Whole to consider the draft report that had been submitted by the Chairman of the Open Ended Working Group, Amb. Lyn Parker (UK), following months of work. From that point on in the RevCon, delegations never knew how work would proceed, what meetings would be called or when, or what would happen next. The newly-elected Chairman of the Committee of the Whole (COW), Amb. Benchaa Dani (Algeria) demonstrated unwillingness to heed advice and inability to effectively chair a meeting, organize work flow, or even to understand points made by delegations on the floor. The COW operated dysfunctionally until the end of the Conference, bringing the RevCon to the brink of failure.

[3](#). (C) By the eighth day of the Conference with no report or agreement in sight, the Chairman of the RevCon, Amb. Waleed El Khereiiji (Saudi Arabia) mounted a rescue operation on April 16. With advice from the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) and

concerned ambassadors, he called together a small negotiating group of 18 countries, representing the European Union (EU), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), states possessing chemical weapons and those with significant chemical industry, as well as some of the leading obstructive delegations (Iran, India, South Africa, and to a lesser extent, Pakistan). In response, the COW Chairman then threatened to resign (twice), but was talked out of it by ambassadors of the small group.

¶4. (C) Chaired by the Saudi Ambassador and advised by the Director-General (DG) and his Deputy (DDG), the negotiating group of 18 worked through two days and nights, with only short breaks for food and sleep, to hammer out the final text. Meanwhile, the COW under Amb. Dani continued work separately on the preliminary section of the report text, in effect the summary of the text. Formal communication between the two bodies was missing, and it was never clear to delegations how the two processes would combine their efforts. In the end, the small group's compromise text was accepted by the Conference at 6:00 a.m. on April 19, with protests voiced by several Asian delegations about the lack of representation and transparency in the process, a view shared but not expressed by many other delegations.

¶5. (U) This cable outlines some of the chaos that transpired during the final days of the Review Conference and some lessons learned for the future.

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

¶6. (SBU) During the first formal meeting of the Committee of the Whole (COW) on Thursday morning (April 10), Chairman Dani stated that it was important to work from the document prepared by the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) under Amb. Parker. He expressed openness to all contributions from the floor on procedures. The Cuban Ambassador, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), presented the NAM's document with all of their agreed positions, essentially a counter-text to the OEWG Chairman's draft. Other delegations spoke to the need for moving to smaller, informal drafting meetings that could report back to the COW and to limiting the time for interventions to keep things moving. Mexico stated that a paragraph-by-paragraph discussion of the text would not be practical, but proposed instead that discussion center on different sections of the text to identify the most contentious portions for negotiation. Iran and India urged that the full Committee of the Whole, particularly new delegations that had not participated in the working group, have the opportunity to express their views and discuss the entire text. Iran noted that the COW was not the place for drafting. The Chairman concluded that the COW would discuss the entire draft text, urging the delegations to work "well and fast."

¶7. (SBU) Amb. Dani then quickly gaveled through all 142 paragraphs of the draft report in under 20 minutes, in what he referred to as a "first reading" of the report. The only interventions during this "first reading" were made by Switzerland and South Africa, who indicated that they wanted the report to include references to incapacitating agents (Switzerland) and the OPCW's Programme for Africa (South Africa). The absence of any clear explanation by Amb. Dani on process and procedure from the outset left most delegations in the dark and set the tone for much of the remainder of the Conference.

¶8. (C) Immediately after this "first reading," the

COW broke into an informal meeting to discuss the report, moving from the large plenary hall to a much smaller conference room at the Convention Center used for consultations. Since nearly everyone moved to the smaller room, it was packed and air-less, with many delegates standing. Amb. Dani began discussion of the first section of the report, but tried to force each paragraph to agreement. His lack of success and resulting resentment was palpable. He then assigned a small group by fiat to draft new text for one paragraph over the lunch break; there were widespread complaints in the room over that procedure including from the three or four delegations named. After more time was spent discussing whether to move to a larger room to accommodate all interested delegates than was spent on the substance of the report, Amb. Dani broke for lunch and agreed to resume the meeting in the OPCW chamber traditionally used for Executive Council meetings, where the COW met for the rest of the Conference.

¶9. (C) From Thursday afternoon (April 10), the COW laboriously worked its way through the report, occasionally progressing on some portions while regressing on others, and leaving the majority of the text bracketed with competing proposals. Throughout these discussions, Amb. Dani arrogantly clung to absolute control of the process, despite repeated offers by various delegations (both formally and behind-the-scenes) to assist. He was not familiar with the text or issues and appeared not to understand many of the delegations' interventions; his attempts to suggest compromise text rarely found support. He floundered in the chair, ineptly asking,

"How many agree with this?" instead of, "Any objections?"

GENERAL COMMITTEE -- SAGE ADVICE IGNORED

¶10. (C) The General Committee, composed of the ten vice chairs elected by the regional groups (Kenya, Nigeria, China, Iran, Czech Republic, Russia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, France and the U.S.), and advised by the Director-General and senior TS staff, was convened only sporadically the first week of the Conference. The normal role of the General Committee to help manage the work of the Conference and advise its Chairmen was not utilized by the Saudi Chair until it became clear that the Committee of the Whole was dysfunctional. In early meetings of the General Committee, Amb. El Khereiji, as would be expected, expressed complete confidence in and deferred to Amb. Dani's chairmanship of the COW.

¶11. (C) Early in the second week, The U.S. proposed in the General Committee that facilitations on critical issues begin urgently. Everyone in the General Committee agreed, even the Iranian Ambassador after some skeptical questions. The Technical Secretariat asked DelRep for a list of possible topics and times for facilitations, and we promptly produced a notional list for the General Committee to consider. Amb. Dani obstinately proceeded to ignore for two more days the counsel of his peers in the General Committee to begin facilitations, as he continued to personally chair the large Committee of the Whole, with no agreement resulting on the draft report text.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

¶12. (C) On Wednesday morning (April 16), Amb. Jorge Lomonaco (Mexico) hosted a breakfast meeting at his

residence in an attempt to help move the Conference forward. Attendees included Chairmen El Khereiiji and Dani, Amb. Javits, and the ambassadors of the UK, Cuba, Germany, India and Iran. While the meeting did not reach any decisions, the ambassadors did discuss the need for facilitators to assist Amb. Dani, which he stubbornly continued to reject. The Indian and Iranian ambassadors both noted a deepening mistrust among delegations, commented on fundamental differences held on a number of issues, including verification, and stressed the need for balance between Article VII implementation and Art XI cooperation and assistance.

¶13. (C) Following the fruitless morning session of the COW on Wednesday (April 16), the Director General hosted a lunch for the General Committee and senior TS staff. This meeting was the turning point for the conduct of the Conference. Several ambassadors and TS senior representatives urged Amb. Dani to allow facilitators to hold consultations on the most disputed topics. Amb. Dani continued to insist that the process remain transparent and that the only way to achieve this was through continuing discussion among all delegations in the COW. The DG and others argued that after two readings of the report in the COW, most delegations would prefer to sacrifice some transparency in order to reach agreement on a final document rather than finish the RevCon with nothing at all. Amb. El Khereiiji diplomatically raised his proposal for a small consultative group to begin negotiating the remaining issues apart from the COW. Following the lunch, plans proceeded quickly for this "rescue operation" of some 18 countries to begin work in a secret location the next morning.

¶14. (C) (Del note: Well after the Conference, Amb. El Khereiiji told Amb. Javits that he had had the idea of a small group in mind even before the Conference started but was reluctant to raise it because of strong opinions among the Europeans and others he consulted that the Iranians should not be permitted to have closed meetings with the Americans as they had done at the conclusions of the First RevCon and at several CSPs since then. Amb. El Khereiiji said he had asked the Iranian ambassador that Wednesday for his suggestions for the composition of the group, but expanded the list well beyond those few Iran had proposed. He also said the list was never closed and noted that many other countries ended up sitting in on the small group meetings.)

FACILITATIONS -- TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

¶15. (C) On Wednesday afternoon, April 16, without warning, Amb. Dani suddenly announced the launch of five facilitations, naming the new facilitators on the floor of the RevCon without prior consultation with them. The Mexican Ambassador was not present at the time; his surprised deputy said he would have to contact his ambassador to see if he were available and willing to chair a meeting that afternoon. Amb. Lomonaco later told Delreps that he was furious; he only agreed to serve as a facilitator to help salvage the RevCon.

¶16. (C) These facilitations were allowed only about two hours each in a confused schedule of rooms and topics. Led by the Ambassadors of Mexico, Germany, Sudan, Brazil, and a senior delegate from Switzerland, the consultations were nevertheless a useful exercise, and some of the discussions made progress on agreed language. If they had been allowed more time, they might have been even more useful. However, Amb. Dani reconvened the COW even

as many delegates were in the facilitation meetings, so that some issues were discussed concurrently -- with different results. All-in-all, it was too little, too late.

¶17. (C) Late Wednesday evening, the General Committee met to plan for the next day. The Saudi Ambassador purposely absented himself. It was agreed that the small negotiating group would commence its negotiations the following morning in a relatively private room at the Convention Center. When asked what the rest of the Conference delegations would do, the Russian representative cynically suggested that they be given the opening section to work on. The Iranian ambassador complained about the simultaneous meetings, but the Director General advised him pointedly to send his "best delegate" to the COW, as all delegations needed to participate in the work of the Conference.

I TRIED TO RESIGN BUT THEY WOULDN'T LET ME

¶18. (C) Thursday morning, April 17, started with a meeting of the small negotiating group of 18 countries in one of the OPCW Conference rooms, during which Amb. Dani attempted to tender his resignation as Chairman of the COW. He announced that he had been unable to sleep the night before due to the extreme amount of pressure he was under, and that he "could not stand pressure." Despite being an experienced diplomat and believing that facilitations were the way to proceed, he insisted that he had been forced into accepting facilitation, which had failed. The other ambassadors present, in an effort to

dissuade him, expressed confidence in him and encouraged him to continue deliberations in the COW, noting the important work that remained to be done. (Del note: Amb. El Khereiiji weeks later told Amb. Javits that Dani had phoned him earlier that Thursday morning at home to say he was resigning, that he could not take the pressure. Amb. El Khereiiji said he had tried to "stroke his ego" so the conference could continue, but Dani still repeated his resignation later that morning at the meeting.)

¶19. (C) Amb. Dani's wounded pride and frustration at being marginalized again came to the fore when he announced to the entire Committee of the Whole later that morning that he had offered his resignation and wished that it had been accepted.

THE RESCUE OPERATION BEGINS

¶20. (C) The invited members of the small group included 16 countries (Brazil, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, the UK, and the U.S.) and two observers (Cuba for the NAM and Slovenia for the EU). The Saudi Ambassador chaired the meetings, with the Director General or his Deputy or Ralf Trapp sitting by his side, and the group began working through the entire report late Thursday morning (April 17). Progress at first was slow, with the discussion mirroring the polarized debate from the COW and the earlier working group discussions of the same text. Much of the text was bracketed in order to move on. The group worked through meals, with sandwiches ordered in by the TS, and took no breaks until early Friday morning.

¶21. (C) At one point on Thursday evening, the Iranian ambassador disappeared and his delegation could not speak to any of the issues on the table. Realizing

that any agreements would all be re-opened by the Iranians the next day, a British delegate consulted with key western delegations, and Amb. Javits subsequently took the floor to insist that the Iranian Ambassador be called back into the negotiations. Iranian Amb. Ziaran could not have been far away, because he re-appeared soon afterwards and the discussion continued. At the request of the Indian Ambassador that she needed to sleep, Amb. El Khoreiji agreed to recess for a break at 4:00 a.m. Friday morning to reconvene at 9:00, although he said he himself was prepared to continue straight through.

THE COW PLODS ON

¶22. (C) Following the aborted facilitations, and the sequestering of the small negotiating group, Amb. Dani reconvened the Committee of the Whole on Thursday, April 17, to begin one more discussion of the introductory paragraphs of the draft report. Delegations were confused as to their role and asked about the small group, which Amb. Dani described as "normal consultations" with no details as to which delegations were participating or what report sections they were discussing. The Swiss delegate announced a meeting that morning to continue his facilitation on the functioning of the Organization, only to find that it was not needed any longer and few delegations showed up. As with his appointment by Amb. Dani as a facilitator, neither was he told that the negotiations had moved elsewhere. Most of the delegations that were participating in the small group also sent delegates to represent their countries in the COW, although Pakistan's chair was empty. The discussion settled into the well worn path

of known positions, following earlier COW discussions during the RevCon of the same material just as with even earlier sessions in the Open Ended Working Group.

¶23. (C) By Friday, the final day of the Conference, a number of delegations (Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Italy, Slovakia, Malta, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, Nigeria) requested briefings on the activities of the small negotiating group, including which delegations were represented, and how the COW's deliberations would mesh with the work being done in the other group. Amb. Dani provided very little information, raising the level of dissatisfaction with the transparency and legitimacy of the process. U.S. Del joined others in formally requesting a briefing by the Chair of the RevCon or the DG on the small group's negotiations, in an effort to increase transparency and lower frustrations. The DG did brief the COW just before the Friday lunch break, but did not reveal the countries involved in the smaller group nor provide any real insight into the progress being made.

¶24. (C) Throughout the deliberations in the COW, the Iranian delegate consistently blocked any compromise language, either citing NAM positions or insisting that he "had no instructions" on the matter at hand. Amb. Dani lectured many delegates on the need to compromise during the debate, but became incensed with the Iranian obstruction. At one point, he told him that it was the day before the end of the Conference and that he "had better get instructions." On another issue, Amb. Dani asked whether other NAM members present agreed with the characterization of the NAM position by the Iranian delegation. Several NAM members spoke against what Iran was portraying as the NAM position. The Cuban delegate intervened to state that the NAM position was guidance and not immutable; delegations, of course, were free to

express their national views. By Friday, the Iranian delegates were constantly referring to the need to wait for the results from the "other room" and that "nothing was decided until everything was decided." When Amb. Dani reacted to Iran's total disregard and disrespect for the proceedings of the COW, the Iranian delegate dramatically stormed out of the room.

¶25. (C) Without Iran present, the COW suddenly began meaningful negotiations and reached consensus on much of the introductory text. A small group of interested parties agreed to draft compromise language over the lunch break on the most controversial paragraphs on terrorism. Colombia, Indonesia, France, Russia, the U.S. and others crafted a paragraph on terrorism, citing the UN Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions (including UNSCR 1540). It included a caveat to allay NAM concerns that the OPCW is independent from the United Nations but contributes to broader global efforts to combat terrorism. This draft language was later approved by the COW, minus Iran. Unfortunately, much later that evening in the small group, Iran turned that text on its head by emphasizing the autonomy of the OPCW and gutting the UN references and international cooperation.

WAITING FOR GODOT

¶26. (SBU) The COW wrapped up its work on the introductory paragraphs of the report late Friday afternoon. At Amb. Dani's instruction that the COW would formally re-convene in plenary at 7:30 p.m., delegations dutifully moved to the auditorium in the Convention Center, awaiting a text of the rest of the

report from the small group and discussion of the final draft text. They were to wait a very long time indeed.

SMALL GROUP SHIFTS INTO HIGH GEAR

¶27. (C) When the small group of 18 met again after a few hours of sleep on Friday morning, they began work on the text where they had left off (Article X). However, a growing sense of unease spread as many people began to realize how much of the text was left -- both bracketed from the day before and sections yet to be discussed. The Saudi ambassador proved himself to be a very capable chair, shifting into a much faster mode and pushing decisions through. The Director General weighed in actively advising the Chairman on the text, as did UK Amb. Parker, who knew the sections intimately from the working group draft and could identify all the fault lines. Both Amb. Parker and the Director General were helpful in moving through difficult issues. Deals were also brokered at the margins of the table, usually by one or two delegations with Iran, and occasionally India and Pakistan. All of these marginal deals were brought back to the larger group to approve. Unfortunately, the TS assistants trying to record the agreed changes to the text could not always keep up with the rapid pace. The final text shows some of the awkwardness and inaccuracies of speed editing, and some omissions may have been made inadvertently.

¶28. (C) (Del Note: The UK delegation told DelRep after the RevCon that Amb. Parker had purposely chosen to sit near the head of the table so that he and the Director General could quietly guide the chair through the text and the negotiations. At least one delegation, which was near the other end of

the table, said they had considered moving closer to the head of the table to hear more of what was going on and to be more active.)

¶29. (C) By about 9:00 Friday evening, the small group came to the end of the report with agreement on almost all paragraphs, except for the introduction (which had been left for the COW) and the paragraphs on terrorism and UNSCR 1540. At Iran's urging, Amb. El Khereiiji agreed to leave aside the terrorism reference and tackle the introduction. The U.S. Delegation and others noted that the COW had been able to reach agreement on most of the introduction and encouraged those present to be mindful of the work of all those delegations not represented in the small group. The Indian ambassador pointedly responded that she did not recognize the work of the COW and insisted that she would abandon the negotiations wholesale if the small group could not edit the introduction as it wished. Her comments were echoed by Iran and Pakistan, who had, like India, essentially abandoned the COW in favor of the small negotiating group.

¶30. (C) Despite the palpably tense atmosphere in the room following the Indian ambassador's protestations, the group agreed to go through the introduction to make sure it tracked with the changes made in the rest of the text. Using the COW's revised draft, delegations proceeded to walk back or slash a number of paragraphs that had achieved consensus in the COW.

¶31. (C) Despite not having finished the introduction, by 11:00 p.m. the DG suggested breaking in order to hold a plenary session of the COW and to update the increasingly restless delegations that were milling around the corridors of the Convention Center. It was agreed to do so only on the understanding that the small group would reconvene to finalize the report.

AND THEN TIME STOOD STILL

¶32. (SBU) When it became apparent that the small group would not finish before midnight, Amb. Javits sent a Delrep to consult with the TS on the legality of continuing the proceedings beyond the scheduled date of April 18, when the RevCon's mandate officially expired, or, in the alternative, arranging to "stop the clock." With midnight fast approaching, the Secretariat's solution was to place a large clock near the podium and to stop it at 11:55 p.m., thereby allowing the Conference to continue as long as necessary. The Conference formally reconvened to stop the clock and take care of a few other procedural matters. Delegations were informed that a draft text of the report would be available shortly. After this brief interlude, the Conference again recessed, with most delegations consigned to waiting while the small group reconvened to finish deliberating the report. Delegations began to thin noticeably with departures for flights, other engagements, or sleep.

¶33. (C) After having been cooped up for two days and with only a few final paragraphs left to consider, the mood in the small negotiating group was increasingly strained. Delegations appeared to have reached a point where they were unwilling to make any more concessions. Things came to a head when the South African delegate objected to a one-sentence reference to challenge inspections in the introduction, claiming that developed countries were using the threat of challenge inspections as a sword pointed toward smaller, developing countries. At

this point, Amb. Javits seized the opportunity to intervene, lambasting the South African delegate for impugning the trust and integrity of the States Parties to the Convention and for resorting to scare tactics to sway small delegations. He described the challenge inspection as a sword of Damocles hanging over everyone, best if never used. Stunned silence ensued.

¶34. (C) Like a thunderstorm breaking open the oppressive atmosphere to allow the rain to fall, delegations began to heed Amb. Javits' call and reached agreement on the remaining portions of the text. All was agreed -- except for the paragraphs on terrorism. Iran had repeatedly insisted that its willingness to concede on other issues was dependent on having acceptable language on terrorism. While other delegations were willing to agree to the compromise language from the COW, the Iranian delegation continued to object. Amb. El Khereiji, noting that all of the options and arguments had already been discussed, instructed Iran to draft language and to work with other delegations to reach agreement. He then adjourned the small group around 2:30 a.m. to give the TS time to consolidate the text before distributing it for plenary consideration.

DEALING WITH THE DEVIL

¶35. (C) As the small group adjourned, the Iranian Ambassador approached Amb. Javits and asked for input on the terrorism language. Amb. Javits commented that the draft sentences they showed him did not meet the needs of other delegations. He said the text should include reference to UNSCR 1540 and cooperation between the OPCW and the UN and other international organizations working to counter terrorism. He also said the paragraph should be

highlighted in the introduction and that he looked forward to seeing their final proposal.

¶36. (C) It later emerged that the Iranian delegation went to the French delegation privately and presented their proposed terrorism language, indicating that Amb. Javits had agreed to it. The French delegation then agreed to accept the Iranian proposal (without checking back with the U.S.) as the best deal they could get. The Iranian "deal" repeated the language of the First Review Conference in the introduction, noting the increased threat of terrorism, and relegated the other paragraph to the final section of the report on the Functioning of the Organization. That paragraph emphasized the autonomy of the OPCW and merely "took cognizance of the resolutions of the United Nations on combating terrorism." Iran then presented their draft to the TS as agreed language to be inserted in the report with no further meeting or consultation by the small group.

¶37. (C) The EU called a meeting to discuss the text and agreed to accept the weakened terrorism language. Many delegations did so reluctantly as UNSCR 1540 had been a key EU objective. When the U.S. Delegation advised the French and several other delegations, as well as the TS, that the U.S. had not seen the final Iranian terrorism language nor agreed to it, the Iranian ambassador made a blunt threat that if delegations wanted to "re-open" the text, they could take responsibility for not reaching a final report. European delegations told U.S. DelReps that they had accepted the terrorism language to avoid scuttling the entire report.

THE FINAL SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE

¶38. (SBU) Meanwhile, weary delegates continued to mill around and wait. By 4:00 a.m. Saturday, April 19, the TS started to distribute the draft of the final report. Amb. Dani reconvened the COW and asked for delegations to approve the circulated report. Echoing comments previously made by several delegations, the Philippines delegate insisted that time be given for all delegations to review the final report before adopting it; she also stated that she did not recognize the introductory paragraphs as they did not reflect what had been agreed earlier by the COW. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand supported the Philippines. Amb. Dani replied that, unfortunately, there was no time to recess and the report had to be approved immediately. The Philippines delegate intervened a second time, supported by other Southeast Asian and several European delegations, and Amb. Dani finally agreed to recess for a token 30 minutes for delegations to review the draft report.

¶39. (SBU) Following the 30-minute review period, and as dawn began to break outside, the Committee of the Whole approved the final report, despite many delegations (including the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand) lamenting strongly the lack of transparency or full representation of all delegations in the process. The plenary session of the Review Conference then adopted the report of the Committee of the Whole. As many delegates nodded off in sleep, the final formalities and votes of thanks concluded the Conference.

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

¶40. (C) The results of the Review Conference, the final report, and evaluations of the procedures for producing that report will all provide fodder for

analysts for a long time to come. The Del's initial list of lessons for the future and recommendations for the next Review Conference follows:

-- Representation and transparency do matter greatly. The NAM has preempted the role of several regional groups that do not work well, and a few delegations (Iran, India, South Africa, fronted by Cuba) have taken over the NAM. The regional groups need to be held to higher levels of accountability by and toward their constituents, with a spotlight on their representatives' actions.

-- Personalities also matter a great deal. While a lot of lobbying and discussion took place before choosing and recruiting the Saudi Chairman, less thought was given to the even more critical role of the Committee of the Whole. The main concern, at that time, was to get anyone other than the Iranian Ambassador as Chairman. Amb. Dani, while well respected, proved disastrously incompetent in chairing the major work of the Conference.

-- Conference structures and meetings at different levels should have clearly stated agendas and purpose. The General Committee in this RevCon was not used by the leadership to share responsibility and information about the workflow. Regional groups were not required during the RevCon to hold regular meetings nor tasked with disseminating information. The Committee of the Whole never had a published or pre-agreed agenda for any of its meetings and often lacked specificity on the time and place for the next meeting.

-- Facilitations should start early and provide

continuity between the working group preparations and the Conference itself. In this RevCon, facilitations commenced in the Open Ended Working Group only after the draft text had been completed two weeks before the Conference, and then re-started under different facilitators far too late during the RevCon. Early appointment of capable facilitators, even before the RevCon begins, could provide additional expertise and experience in resolving specific issues, and ideally would allow earlier agreement on the bulk of the text.

-- No delegation should be allowed to hijack the process. Iran followed past practice by holding the entire text hostage until the bitter end, and by insisting on secret negotiations. This RevCon broadened the number of delegations participating in the small negotiating group, far more than some of the back room meetings of past Executive Councils and Conferences of States Parties. But, Iran could have been more effectively isolated by putting the small group on record -- formally recording the proceedings on video tape, and requiring the group's representatives to be endorsed by and to report back to the regional groups.

-- Professional facilitation and chairing techniques could be taught more widely to multilateral delegates. Dealing with conflict or obstruction in a meeting is a skill that few people have instinctively, but it can be learned. Facilitators for large multilateral meetings should be known to have the necessary skills before being asked to chair critical issues.

141. (U) Javits sends.
Gallagher